Cognitive metaphor theorists have identified a number of mappings that, it has been claimed, are both central to thinking and productive of linguistic metaphors. One of these is UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. In this article, we re-examine UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING using two sources of naturally occurring data. Our first source is the Oxford English Corpus: a two-billion-word corpus of authentic contemporary English texts, from which we extracted a 1,000-citation concordance of the lemma SEE. We analyzed this into major sense groups and identified the most frequent lexico-grammatical patterns. Our second source of data is transcribed spoken English from focus-group discussions. We analyzed this dataset, using detailed discourse analysis, to identify the meanings of SEE and its most frequent phraseologies. Both analyses lead us to conclude that SEE is, indeed, used to talk about understanding, as claimed by Conceptual Metaphor theorists, but that the metaphor usually describes difficulties with understanding another speaker's point of view or, more generally, the process of reaching an understanding: that is, it is used to talk about understanding or not understanding as processes, not states. Our findings are consistent with the construal of language and thought as a dynamic system.
ubiquitous. Because these linguistic metaphors are believed to realize structural relationships, Conceptual Metaphor Theory predicts that they should demonstrate the same semantic relations in the target as in the source domain. Although Conceptual Metaphor Theory regards language as secondary to thought, given language's importance as evidence for thought and the theory's strong predictions about language patterning, detailed analysis of language patterning is potentially very illuminating.
In this paper, we return to the mapping UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING and re-examine it using current techniques from two traditions within applied linguistics: corpus analysis and discourse analysis. These techniques have developed considerably since the early formulation of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in 1980; their potential contribution to cognitive linguistics is now widely recognized (e.g., Stefanowitsch & Gries 2006 , Gibbs 2010 . We describe uses of see that have elements of metaphorical and metonymic meaning found in a large general corpus of current English;
we describe their patterns of form and meaning. We describe the figurative use of see in a smaller corpus of focus-group data, analyzed using techniques that focus on the development of speaker meaning through unfolding discourse. The kind of knowing or understanding described in these figurative expressions adds to the description arising from the discussions in the conceptual metaphor literature, but differs in being more modal, partial, and interpretative. Before turning to discussions of and evidence for UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, we discuss in more detail aspects of metaphor in thought and language.
CHARACTERISTICS OF NATURALLY OCCURRING NON-LITERAL LANGUAGE

Fixedness and stability
Much metaphorical language seems to occur in semi-fixed expressions, with relatively stable syntactical and lexical patterns and specific affective and pragmatic meanings (Cameron & Deignan 2006) . The relationship between fixedness and meaning is not a new observation: researchers working within corpus-based and applied linguistic traditions have noted that words tend to fall into semi-fixed syntactic patterns (Sinclair 2004 , Hunston & Francis 2001 . These are strongly associated with meaning, with different meanings of the same word tending to demonstrate different syntactic patterns. So Hunston and Francis (1998) demonstrate that the word consider has a large number of related but distinct senses, each associated with a different syntactic pattern. When followed by the -ing form of the verb -in citations such as 'they are considering providing free electricity' -the meaning is 'think about doing something in the future', whereas when consider is ditransitive -as in 'he does not consider himself a celeb' or 'it is valid to consider memory the oldest human skill' -it means 'have an opinion about something' (examples from Hunston & Francis 1998: 47) .
One of the authors, Deignan, has argued that this tendency can help to distinguish literal from metaphorical uses of words (2005) . At the major level of part of speech, she has found a tendency for word use in animal metaphors to be verbal rather than nominal, probably because they tend to refer to behaviour. For instance, the words wolf, squirrel, horse, hound, ape, and hare are all used to refer to people, but only as verbs -poetic or innovative use excepted. At a more detailed level, syntactic patterns such as whether verbs are typically used in active or passive voice and whether nouns are count or non-count or are typically used in the singular or plural are associated with specific literal or metaphorical meanings of words.
A similar degree of fixedness is associated with lexical patterning. In the same book (2005), Deignan shows that when the word pay appears in the vicinity of price, both words are likely to have a metaphorical meaning: consider expressions such as pay a high price for, a small price to pay, and to pay the price. Many metaphorical meanings are closely associated with fixed collocations: when rock is used metaphorically to mean 'secure', it tends to occur in the collocations rock steady and rock solid. Direction is used metaphorically to refer to people's future choices in life; although it can combine relatively freely, this meaning is found in such expressions as a step in the right direction. Deignan (2010) suggests that the tendency towards lexical and syntactic fixedness, while a feature of all language, is stronger for metaphorically used words than for their literal counterparts. Conceptual Metaphor Theory is not concerned with linguistic patterning but with the patterns of thought that, it is claimed, underlie language use. From its perspective, the examples above might be considered noise, unworthy of close study. We disagree, believing that such details raise such important questions as the following (Cameron & Deignan 2006: 673): (1) Why are linguistic metaphors apparently subject to grammatical and lexical restrictions?
(2) If linguistic metaphors are the expression of a broad conceptual mapping, why are they so unevenly and inconsistently distributed?
Non-literal language and emergence: metaphoremes
Possible answers to these questions can be found by casting language and thought as forming a complex dynamic system within which patches of stability emerge over time. In complex systems, stabilities -or attractor states -are not predictable, though they can be explained post hoc (LarsenFreeman & Cameron 2008) . This seems characteristic of such semi-fixed metaphorical expressions as pay a high price for, a step in the right direction, and emotional baggage (Cameron & Deignan 2006) as found in natural language data. Their fixedness and frequency in natural language qualify them to be considered as stabilities. They can be explained post hoc using a conceptual-mapping model of metaphor, such that the model predicts their occurrence, but not their specific features. We have termed stabilities like these 'metaphoremes', where a metaphoreme is 'a bundle of relatively stable patterns of language use' (Deignan & Cameron 2006: 686) . This paper examines linguistic metaphors associated with seeing, extracted from naturally occurring corpus and discourse-data. We find a number of metaphoremes. Our theoretical background is a complex dynamic-systems framework in which conceptual metaphors are one force contributing to the emergence of linguistic metaphors, alongside other forces that may be affective, pragmatic, linguistic, or contextual. We hope to demonstrate that this approach can give a more subtle account of metaphor at the level of language -and also, possibly, at the level of thought. Before turning to the data, we discuss previous research into the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING mapping.
STUDIES OF UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING
Linguistic evidence and patterns of meaning in contemporary English
Scholars have described what seems to be roughly the same metaphor, in which vision is mapped onto cognition, variously terming the mapping UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, KNOWING IS SEEING, or THINKING IS SEEING -the implications of the different wordings are of possible interest, but we will not explore that here; the examples cited strongly suggest that the same mapping and correspondences are intended by the different wordings, and we will therefore regard them as equivalent. Here, we use Lakoff and Johnson's UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, which seems to be the most frequently used. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 48) What is your outlook on that?
Now I've got the whole picture.
Lakoff and Johnson do not explore in detail the patterns of meaning in these examples. Note that their examples concern both the act of seeing and the product of the act (the picture) -and, by implication, the dynamic of not-seeing and then seeing: of coming into vision or becoming visible. We take up these points below in the discussion of our own data.
Sweetser cites as evidence for the mapping KNOWING IS SEEING (1990: 37) There is more to this than meets the eye.
That is my point of view.
I do not agree with your viewpoint.
That's the way I visualize it.
It all depends on how you look at it.
Seeing is believing.
I cannot quite picture that.
He classifies (1990: 224) THINKING IS SEEING metaphors into three groups, the first focusing on the physical process of seeing:
I do not see the point of your argument.
We never see eye to eye on matters.
I view things differently.
Both Lakoff and Johnson's examples and, to some extent, Sweetser's are concerned both with 'not seeing' (metaphorically: not thinking or understanding) and seeing -a point we return to below.
The second group concerns differences in perception, framed metaphorically as differences in the intensity of a light source that illuminates the object of seeing:
That was a brilliant idea.
I take a dim view of that whole affair.
What you are saying is not very clear. The argument is clear.
It's a transparent argument.
The discussion was opaque.
Etymology and cross-linguistic studies
As well as being broadly agreed upon by cognitive scholars, the mapping of SEEING onto KNOWING /UNDERSTANDING /THINKING has been noted by lexicographers. The 'understand' meaning of see is listed in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (SOED), defined as 'to perceive mentally, to apprehend by thought (a truth etc); to recognize the force of (a demonstration) often with ref. to metaphorical light or eyes ' (1971: 1928) . The SOED traces the earliest citations of this usage to Middle English. The Oxford English Dictionary Online lists the following, attested in Old English: 'to know by observation (ocular and other), to witness; to meet with in the course of one's experience; to have personal knowledge of, to be a contemporary of and present at the scene of (an event); to be living at (a certain period of time). Also, to experience (a specific age in life): usu. in negative context.' Meanwhile, Sweetser investigates the etymology of perception verbs including see, arguing that (1990: 23) : 'the historical and synchronic data point to one and the same cognitively based analysis of the relevant semantic domain'.
Sweetser finds evidence for the mapping across a number of Indo-European languages: 'vision verbs commonly develop abstract senses of mental activity ' (1990: 33) . Allan notes evidence of the mapping in some Austronesian and Afroasiatic languages (2008: 58-61) . Where mappings are shared across a wide number of languages and cultures, it seems likely they originate in experience that is universal to human beings, not culturally specific. Sweetser argues that the widespread nature of the mapping shows it has an embodied and experiential basis. Kövecses (2002) is of the same opinion, pointing out that KNOWING IS SEEING has its roots in physical experience: to know or understand something, one often must see it first. 'The source domain is a precondition for the event in the target to occur…. Seeing makes knowing possible in many cases' (Kövecses 2002: 158) . Sweetser develops the experiential argument, claiming that sight feels like the most reliable and objective of the five senses: 'two people who stand in the same place are generally understood to see the same thing ' (1990: 39) . She argues that this attribute of physical seeing is mapped onto the figurative sense, so that metaphorically seeing is objective: 'the objective, intellectual side of our mental life seems to be regularly linked with the sense of vision ' (1990: 37) . She claims that figurative expressions referring to opinions or points of view are not counterevidence: different points of view imply the same entity viewed from different locations. By implication, if the same entity is viewed from the same location, it will be seen -and understood metaphorically -in the same way.
The research reported here finds general agreement on two central points: the abstract domains of knowing and understanding are often understood through the concrete domain of physical vision, and the metaphorical correspondences spread into related domains such as light and darkness. Where Sweetser or, to a lesser extent, Kövecses discuss the nature of thinking or understanding, metaphorical SEEING is described explicitly as an objective process, owing to its grounding in the (supposedly) objective nature of literal seeing. Some of the examples they cite suggest, however, that the mapping is not always so straightforward, even though, with the exception of Danesi (1990) who explores these subtleties in his discussion of the modalities of seeing and thinking, this is not commented on. A further gap in the abovementioned discussions lies in the nature of the evidence presented. For those of us who are applied linguists, there are limitations to the use of decontextualised examples, especially when they do not come from natural language in use. We begin the next section with a brief discussion of this issue.
METHODS
Using complementary, naturally-occurring data sources
The linguistic data cited in support of the claims in the previous section seem, in most cases, to be intuitively sourced. Where citations are taken from naturally occurring data, they are almost invariably presented as isolated expressions or sentences, without their wider co-text. For applied linguists working thirty years after the original work on Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this methodological decision raises two problems. First, over the last three decades, it has been repeatedly observed (e.g., Sinclair 2004 ) that language users are not good at producing examples of language that have the usage characteristics of naturally occurring citations. Deignan has argued (2005 Deignan has argued ( , 2008 that studies of metaphorical meaning should always be based on naturally occurring language because subtleties of meaning and form are not retrievable through unaided intuition. Second, assuming the meaning of language samples without considering the wider discourse presents a problem. Cameron has shown (2003, et al. 2009 ) has shown that aspects of meaning -perhaps, especially, figurative meaning -may be built up over a stretch of discourse. Much may be missed when a single utterance or phrase is removed from its surroundings.
For our study, we examined a large number of citations of see and its inflections taken from in naturally occurring data of two types: corpus and discourse data. They differ importantly. Corpora provide large numbers of citations from many different texts. Although a certain amount of context is available, they are normally studied in a window of 80 characters; the analyst usually has no knowledge of the discourse context beyond what she can glean from the name of the text from which the citations are taken. In contrast, discourse data arise from continuous spoken discourse, which has the advantage of allowing the analyst to see how meaning is built up and negotiated between participants during the discourse -something that is not possible in the 'snapshot' approach of corpus work. Often -as in this case -the analyst has a privileged insight into the context of the discourse, having either been a participant or (as here) having a specialized knowledge of the topic or discourse community. Corpus data lack these possibilities but have the advantage of offering a very large number of instances of the language feature under investigation. We have argued elsewhere (Cameron & Deignan 2003 ) that corpus and discourse data can complement each other.
The corpus study
Corpus analysis has been used previously to explore Conceptual Metaphor Theory and has the potential to contribute to further theoretical debate. One example is investigations into the linguistic implications of the domains-mapping hypothesis. Deignan (1999) investigates temperature metaphors for emotion using corpus data, looking for correspondences between literal antonyms such as warm/cool and hot/cold and literal near-synonyms such as icy/ freezing/ frosty in the target domain of emotion: Conceptual Metaphor Theory predicts that parallel relationships should be found in the metaphorical uses of these words. Deignan does, indeed, find a strong tendency to talk about emotions using the lexis of temperature, resulting in frequent linguistic metaphors. However, these metaphors do not form a semantically coherent network. Relationships of antonymy and hyponymy from the source domain are often not replicated in the target domain. One finds detailed patches of correspondence, but no consistent mapping of relationships.
Research into metonymy (Goossens 1995 , Barcelona 2001 ) and embodiment (Gibbs, Lima & Francuzo 2004; Gibbs 2006) in the post-1980 cognitive tradition can explain these findings. The argument is frequently made that much metaphor is grounded in metonymy, which is often the result of embodied experience. In this view, many temperature metaphors arise from metonymies in which the bodily experience associated with an emotion is mapped onto that emotion. Thus, heat is mapped onto anger to produce figurative expressions such as a heated argument. If the domain of emotion is structured by the domain of temperature, one might expect an antonymous use of cold, meaning 'not angry'. In contrast, a metonymy-based account does not predict large-scale systematic mapping: one does not feel cold when one is not angry, so it is not surprising that one does not find metaphorical use of cold with this meaning in naturally occurring language data. The patchiness of the linguistic metaphors found in corpus data is consistent with small-scale mappings of a number of temperature metonymies, rather than one large, structured metaphorical mapping. In our present research, corpus
analysis supports a refinement of Conceptual Metaphor Theory as originally articulated, via a level of linguistic detail that would not be possible using small data sets or invented data. What at first glance seems like linguistic noise has theoretical implications.
For the present study, we used the Oxford English Corpus 1 : a two-billion-word corpus of written and spoken contemporary English from a variety of sources. We randomly sampled 1,000 citations of see/saw/seeing/seen/sees. We read through all 1,000 citations, using Cameron's (2003 Cameron's ( , et al. 2009 version of the 'pragglejaz' procedure (Pragglejaz Group 2007) to identify 'vehicle' terms rather than words (as in the original procedure). Uses were classed as metaphorical if they satisfied both the criteria of contrast between contextual and basic meaning, where the basic meaning of see was taken to be visual perception, and transfer of meaning from the basic to the contextual sense. We identified 523 citations as having some degree of non-literal meaning. We made no attempt to separate metaphor from metonymy, and we included uses that we term 'hybrids' where literal and non-literal meanings seemed to be invoked together (example below). We did not analyze the remaining 477 (literal) citations in detail.
We then re-examined the 523 citations, classifying them into broad semantic groups. Where we found regularities of form, we kept the citations in a separate group. Regularities of form always occurred within the same broad meaning of see. Sometimes these formed a subset of a group of citations with a common meaning: that is, citations with the same general meaning sometimes consisted of a number of smaller groups having different formal patterns. This rarely happened the other way round: similarity of form almost never crossed over from one semantic group to another.
The exception was where the grammatical form is very common, such as where see is followed by a direct object. More complex forms such as see [something] as [something] were unique to a single meaning. We did not use a dictionary at the beginning of the process because of our belief in the 1 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/page/oec importance of corpus-driven analysis (Tognini-Bonelli 2001) : that is, the analyst should not impose pre-determined classifications on the data.
We sorted the concordance of figurative uses alphabetically by the word immediately to the left of see/sees/seen/seeing/saw for ease of reading. We first separated out the non-literal sense that was easiest to identify, in which see is used for cross-reference elsewhere in the text or another text. We then separated out citations in which see means 'perceive in a particular way' or 'find out'. The process was iterative and involved re-reading some citations a number of times. At a later stage in the process, when we thought we had identified the most frequent senses and had a small group of around fifty citations that were difficult to classify, we consulted two corpus-based dictionaries: Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, and Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced
Learners. We did so to help with the classification and definitions and to resolve borderline cases. For one meaning in particular, the Collins Cobuild definition helped us verbalize a meaning that we understood from citations but found difficult to articulate: 'know by observing'. Collins Cobuild also helped with splitting groups of meanings into sub-groups.
As mentioned above, we found a number of hybrids: citations in which an expression seems to lie on the boundary between literal and metaphorical or involve both senses. These citations make it difficult -perhaps pointless -to draw a clear line between metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses.
We feel it methodologically unsound to attempt to do so given the subjectivity involved. Consider:
He is the DA and he's seen all of the evidence.
In this citation, seen is (probably) literally true but also has the entailment 'consider', making it a hybrid of literal and non-literal meanings.
We now describe the second part of our study, before discussing our findings from both parts.
Discourse data from focus group discussions
Our second dataset consists of discourse data from twelve focus-group discussions held in the spring of 2006 on the topic of living with the background risk of terrorism. 2 We recruited eight participants per group in two UK cities: London and Leeds. Groups differed in socioeconomic status, generalized from occupation and education. Separate groups were organized for Muslims and non-Muslims and for men and women. Each discussion lasted about ninety minutes and was structured by a moderator, who asked prepared questions but otherwise left participants to interact with minimum interruption.
The discussions were audio-recorded and transcribed, producing a total of 213,271 words.
Full analysis of the metaphors was carried out using the procedure detailed by Cameron et al. (2009) ; some of the findings are reported in (Cameron and Maslen 2010) . For the present study, we carried out a further round of analysis 3 using the software Wordsmith Tools v.5 (Scott 2007) to extract all instances of the lemma see: i.e., see/seeing/sees/seen/saw. We placed these into an Excel table and sorted them into metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses, following our version of the pragglejaz procedure. As with the corpus data, we found -alongside clearly metaphorical or literal uses -a large group of ambiguous uses we classed as 'hybrid' because a metaphorical sense was possible to infer alongside the literal sense. In some cases, it was clear from the discourse context that both senses were active; in other cases, we were unable to know. Examples from the data include:
They see their families suffering.
I couldn't get into London to see her. The distribution of unambiguously metaphorical uses is different from the other two categories, with a much higher proportion of non-finite uses: 32% of total instances, as against 18% for hybrid and 11%
for literal uses. The non-finite uses result from a tendency for metaphorical uses to be modal or negative, as shown below.
We then examined the metaphorical, literal, and hybrid uses of see for form and meaning to identify patterns of form/meaning relationships.
FINDINGS FROM ANALYSIS OF THE CORPUS DATA
In our analysis of metaphorical, literal, and hybrid citations of SEE, we found five main meaning groups of metaphorical and hybrid senses and a few less frequent -and apparently less significant - All five groups include citations that seem to be hybrids as well as apparently pure metaphors.
Considerably less contextual information is available than for the discourse data, making the decision which citations of SEE are purely figurative and which hybrid -having some element of literal meaning -highly subjective and we believe, in many cases unreliable. Therefore, we did not calculate figures for this dimension of the analysis.
We now describe the five groups in turn, with examples.
'Know' or 'understand'
The first group, in which see seems to mean 'know' or 'understand', consists of several clusters of sub-senses. In the largest of these (79 citations), SEE means something like 'find out' or 'construct knowledge', as in the following examples:
Have students examine the data visualization video to see how scientists display, analyze and interpret scientific data.
It will be interesting to see what actual remedies he is suggesting.
As with these examples, in the majority of citations see is followed by a wh-clause (72 of the 79 citations), showing a tight relationship between form and meaning. See is not followed by a wh-clause with any of the other four broad meaning groups identified in our data. Most of these citations seem to be hybrids; but, in some cases, more knowledge of context is needed to be certain. The metaphor describes coming to an understanding rather than being in a fixed state of understanding.
The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (Sense 4) defines a second sub-sense that is very closely related: 'if you see that something is true or exists, you realise by observing it that it is true or exists', as in the following citation:
Logan clearly has that winner's drive. You can see it the way she discusses her day with the conference PR.
Separating citations into these two groups proved difficult. The first group consists of those citations in which the person who 'sees' is progressing towards a currently unknown understanding; the second consists of those where the subject of the verb confirms knowledge though literal observation: this is a metaphor from metonymy (Goossens 1995 , Barcelona 2001 . Literal seeing is involved, but there is a mapping onto the domain of knowledge. Deignan (2005: 61) describes the process this way: 'an expression develops a meaning though metonymy, a meaning that is then mapped metaphorically onto another domain'. The nineteen citations of this sub-sense are all hybrids.
The citations described so far tend to use a seeing verb in negative or modal form: that is, These expressions suggest approaching understanding -coming round to share another speaker's view -and so they share with the rest of the group the quality of subjectivity and of change (or dynamism)
in moving from not knowing to knowing.
In the 'know, understand' group, we also included the use of see to describe predictions, which have modal meaning by nature (sixteen citations):
I don't see Spain losing to South Africa. I would fully be expecting to play Spain on Sunday.
But I actually saw that coming, and briefly considered nullifying the plans, and then decided against it. If he is not going to be defensive, it is hard to see where the story goes.
Some members resisted at first. But they've seen the big picture, and now they 're patting me on the back.
We are unlikely to see any signs of recovery for a couple of years.
This group of senses appears to represent the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING / KNOWING IS SEEING. They are virtually all modalized, made tentative in some way, and lacking the objectivity that is often attributed to this metaphor, most specifically by Sweetser (1990) . The 'find out' sense describes learning / coming to understanding; the 'know by observation sense' suggests moving from lack of understanding to developing an interpretation; while many citations of the 'understand' sense clearly describe a coming to understand -or failure to do so -that is subjective.
Interpret as
The second group of senses of SEE concerns people's interpretations of a situation. The most frequent (56 citations) is defined by the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary as: 'if you see someone or something as a certain thing, you have the opinion that they are that thing' (Sense 6). These citations take the grammatical form see something as, as in:
In those cultures where women are seen as 'naturally' weak or vulnerable…
In a further 33 citations, the meaning of see is likewise associated with a partial or individual interpretation, but there is no explicit comparison; hence, the grammatical structure as…as is not used:
Latin America is an eye-opener to Wright and she even sees everything differently upon returning to London where she grew up.
That's one of my best sides people keep on telling me, or worst, depending on how you see it.
We include in this group a sub-group of fifteen citations in which see refers to somebody finding a particular quality in something. This sense seems to belong in the group because it shares the connotations of individual -perhaps partial -perceptions.
They are put where the elders see local interest, often in impoverished, run-down neighborhoods, such as in Dorchester or Bridgeport.
Janet Daley in the Telegraph, saw an 'intellectual decadence' she found 'repulsive'.
In fourteen of the fifteen citations, see is followed by a direct object; in the 15 th , see is in the passive voice.
A small number of related citations -five -mention the viewpoint of the person whose perceptions are described and explicitly refer to their stance, sometimes using a metaphor of place.
These always take the form see [something] from.
Given the nature of this problem as you see it from the U.S. perspective… Don Baker has seen farming from both sides now -as a scientific researcher and as a farm consultant.
The fixed expression see eye to eye (one citation) seems to fit this group, because it refers to individual positions and interpretations and hints at other ways of interpreting these positions.
Witness
The third group of citations perhaps represent more objective knowledge. The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary defines this sense as: 'if a period of time or a person sees a particular change or event, it takes place during that period of time or when that person is alive' (Sense 9). To the best of our knowledge, this sense is not widely documented in the metaphor literature. It is fairly frequent in the Oxford English Corpus, possibly because -like many large modern corpora -the Oxford English corpus includes a fairly high proportion of both journalistic texts and texts from the Worldwide Web.
We separated the citations into those in which a person sees a change or event (78 citations) and those in which a time or place sees a change or something (28 citations), even though these are treated together by the dictionary, probably because the meaning of SEE seems to be very similar. However, in terms of metaphor, the nature of the transfer is different: when a person is described as seeing an event or change, the metaphor seems metonymy based; from literal seeing comes the abstract meaning 'know of / experience', as in the following citations:
Are you likely to see $4 gas again in 2009?
There 's this kind of media story that we see every few months.
A subgroup of citations consists of the fairly stable expressions 'would like to see' or 'want to see':
i.e., they talk about desired changes (15 of 78 citations):
I would also like to see businesses serving late night customers.
54-year-old Charles Murray wants to see something done before another accident happens.
Where a time or place is described as seeing an event or change, the time or place may stand metonymically for the people who live during that time or in that place: that is, there is a further level of metonymy, as in the following examples. While some of the previous group could be considered hybrids, none of these can.
Although the later 19th century was to see the creation of the modern nation…
In Glasgow, which saw a 20 % rise in the value of house sales last year.
A final citation that seems to belong with this group is in passive form without a named agent:
It would also promote the interests of Formula One that motor sport be seen to institute a full inquiry into the events.
The emphasis of the metaphor is slightly different; nonetheless, we felt it to belong within the overall meaning of 'witness'.
Control
The fourth main metaphorical group is apparently unrelated to KNOWING IS SEEING, relating instead to CONTROLLING IS SEEING (Sweetser 1990) . In this group (29 citations), see means 'cause':
A vast programme of 'beautification' has seen 40 million flowers and tens of thousands of trees planted in Beijing alone.
Related to this are two phrasal verbs, see through and see to, each of which we found twice.
We really owe it to Canada to see the Gomery Report through to the very end.
Before she could leave, Louisa Hurst had an important matter to see to.
Read
In the fifth group, SEE is used as a metonym for reading or studying. In most citations from this group (92 of 116), SEE is used in the imperative to cross reference another part of the text or a different text.
For example:
The apostle Paul (see On The Road To Damascus), who wrote much of the New Testament…
In five citations it is used anaphorically, in citations such as:
As we have seen, racism is systemic and routinely reproduces the subordinate position of people of colour.
In four of the five citations, see is found in the expression as we have seen.
In a further nine citations, see, meaning 'read', is more freely combining, as in:
Judge Mahony said he had seen some papers and took the matter no further.
This final group seems intrinsically of less interest to an account of figuratively used SEE. The meaning is undoubtedly hybrid, having clear non-literal implications in all citations, but it seems to be a straightforward case of metonymical reference. The action of seeing is -with the exception of situations such as using Braille -criterial to reading or studying; its extension to cover these actions is uncomplicated.
The five remaining citations were not classified into any of the above groups. They comprise two citations of seeing as (meaning 'taking into account that'), one of see the light at the end of the tunnel, one of see fit to, and one of see action.
FINDINGS FROM THE DISCOURSE DATA
Forms of the verb see occur 472 times in the discourse data: 217 are literal uses referring to visual perception, 143 are metaphorical uses, and 112 are hybrid uses potentially concerned with visual perception in some way while having the potential for metaphorical meaning. We concluded that we had sufficient contextual information and familiarity with the content to attempt the classification, although we acknowledge that it is still subjective and would be difficult to replicate.
Metaphorical meaning thus applies in around 54% of uses of SEE in this data. This is very similar to the corpus data, in which metaphorical meaning was involved in 52% of citations (523 of 1000).
Note that the corpus data is predominantly written, and several of the senses described above -notably where see is used to cross-reference within a text -are almost certainly exclusive to writing. The similar proportion of metaphorical use is likely therefore to be coincidental, though interesting.
Investigating the meanings associated with the forms and uses of metaphorical see reveals more about possible patterns. It shows that Sweetser's suggestion that see metaphors are used to imply objective knowledge does not hold -rather the reverse. The two most frequent meaning groups in the data are (1) you see used as discourse marker and (2) interpret as: see [something] as [something] (various phrases using the verb see with as, how, way, etc. to create analogies). Two significant formal patterns are found: (1) modal see (various forms of the verb see + direct object that incorporate modal/auxiliary verbs in the verb phrase) and (2) negative see.
'You see' used as discourse marker
The discourse marker you see accounts for sixty of the metaphorical uses of SEE, including one question form do you see? Its function seems to be to appeal to other speakers to take on or understand temporarily the speaker's opinion or attitude: that is, it is an appeal for intersubjectivity, as seen in the following extracts.
in order not to, make them feel suspicious, 
Interpret as: See [something] as [something]
Thirty-four metaphorical uses of see -that is, 13% of all uses where there is some metaphoricityinvolve interpreting or imagining one thing in terms of another. Speakers use see as to set out for listeners an opinion or attitude held by themselves or attributed to others. Thus, this use specifically stresses the subjectivity of the opinion or attitude that follows. While this particular use may have been frequent in the focus-group discussions because the discussion topics included perspectives on terrorism, it is also relatively frequent in the corpus data, which come from a range of texts: the see…as metaphoreme accounts for 10% of non-literal citations in the corpus data. Percentages are not closely comparable: they could be skewed by the existence in one of the datasets of another, very frequent sense, such as the cross-referencing sense in the corpus data. Nonetheless, it appears that the frequency of this meaning in the discourse data was not unduly influenced by the controversial nature of the topic.
The existence of this meaning directly contradicts claims made for seeing metaphors in respect of objectivity. Discoursally, these seeing as metaphors highlight the inevitable subjectivity of understanding: a theme that plays out across both datasets.
Modal see
In addition to modal auxiliary verbs can, could, would, might, the metaphorical use of see was modalized in expressions such as maybe they are seeing, I was pretty happy to see, and they want to see, and in the following extracts. 
Negative 'see'
Twenty-one of the metaphorical uses of the verb see were in negative form.
but I couldn't see the point in doing that.
but you just can't see it happening I can't just see any other reason, why we would go in.
apart from oil, no one's going to see,
.. everything exactly the same.
The negative forms include negated versions of each of the previous three types: seeing as, you see, and modal see. They are grouped together rather than being included in the first three groups, because their metaphorical use does not seem to be a straightforward inversion of the affirmative forms -as
Conceptual Metaphor Theory and the idea of domain mapping would predict. In the spoken discourse, they are often emphatic -intensified with just or some other word -and function to highlight differences between the speaker's opinion, attitude, or belief about the future and that of some other person or group. They seem to function to resist or deny an understanding that is being imposed on the speaker.
To summarize the meanings of SEE found in the discourse data: each, in some way, is about multiple ways of seeing and about selections or preferences among these multiple possibilities. The discourse data suggest that SEE is used less to speak about what is known and more to speak about what is believed.
DISCUSSION
Findings from the corpus and discourse analysis seem to complement each other. In this section, we consider key issues across both datasets. See expresses a number of related concepts:
(1) change in the state of knowing: moving from not knowing towards knowing, often metonymically through visual perception;
(2) (lack of) understanding in the way that other people do, sometimes referring to a particular ability to "see" patterns that other people cannot or do not "see";
(3) interpretations and relative knowledge; (4) witnessing by a person, time, or place;
(5) in a number of citations, especially where you see occurs, there is a persuasive element encouraging the hearer to perceive events in a particular way.
Each of these seems to be specifically subjective and partial, in contrast to the objectivity suggested by previous studies of the mapping, such as those discussed in Section Three. Many seem to be about alternatives, including hypothetical ones, and about views held by others. Some citations suggest that see is an important way of talking about other people's world views.
Collectively, these meanings suggest that metaphorical 'seeing' is not simply a way of expressing 'understanding'; it is more nuanced, more subjective. It is, perhaps, a better way of describing how people actually think than the word 'understand' offers, with its implication that reality can be directly and objectively accessed.
The corpus data shows a further two senses not found in the discourse data and not related to this mapping: (1) control and (2) read.
In terms of form, both datasets show a limited number of grammatical and lexical patterns associated with close but distinct meanings: that is, stabilities or metaphoremes. 
CONCLUSION
It would be of great interest to investigate related lexis such as light, picture, and view to determine whether similar semantic and formal patterns can be found. Each study of a single item is time consuming because many instances are needed -but ultimately, we feel, extremely worthwhile.
Our findings both challenge and confirm aspects of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. On the one hand, we have argued that some earlier descriptions of the mapping SEEING IS UNDERSTANDING are
inaccurate and oversimplify what happens when see is used non-literally. On the other, our findings support the contention that people use metaphors to express concepts 'that simply cannot be easily or clearly expressed with literal speech' (Gibbs 1994: 125) . The nature of human knowledge and understanding is, perhaps, one of those concepts; the literal terms 'know' and 'understand' cannot capture its nature as subtly as metaphors from the domain of vision can. Our findings on meanings of metaphorical see are likely to hold true for many metaphors. Cameron has argued extensively (e.g.,
2003
) that metaphor is used to manage alterity and modality, while Deignan (2010) claims that evaluation is one of metaphor's central functions.
Our findings are also consistent with the construal of language and thought as a complex dynamical system. In more than 1000 citations of non-literal see we have investigated, we find a number of pockets of stability: of co-occurrence of detailed lexical and grammatical patterning with highly specific meanings.
Nothing that we have said in this paper is at odds with the central contention of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. However, our findings demonstrate how some interpretations of the theory, leading to sometimes sweeping generalizations about language, tend to mask the subtlety of metaphorical language at work in people's everyday interactions. We also hope to have highlighted the potential for giving language a central -rather than subordinate -role in analysis.
